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ABSTRACT
Section 10(1)(g) of the Singapore Income Tax Act is a ‘sweeping-up’ provision
which catches all income not falling under sections 10(1)(a)–(f). More than 50
years after its introduction, the application of section 10(1)(g) is still unclear
despite the test laid out in IB v CIT. This article notes that the current
jurisprudence is limited to cases involving gains or proﬁts from the disposal of
assets. It argues that the reliance on the Australian Myer Emporium test in IB v
CIT was misplaced and that the section 10(1)(g) test should not have a sole
focus on intention. Rather, it proposes a set of indicia of income drawn from
the Badges of Trade, which it argues to be consistent with the existing
jurisprudence. The article highlights that the tax consequences of receipts
being assessed under sections 10(1)(a) or (g) are diﬀerent and notes the
importance of the receipts being assessed under the correct subsection.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 20 November 2018; Accepted 29 May 2019
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1. Introduction
Section 10(1)(g) of the Singapore Income Tax Act 19471 (SITA) (in pari materia
with section 4(f) of the Malaysian Income Tax Act 19672 (MITA))3 contains a
‘sweeping-up’ provision that catches: ‘any gains or proﬁts of an income
nature not falling within any of the preceding paragraphs’. This article
traces the history of the provision from the circumstances which arguably
led to its enactment, examining the development of the jurisprudence over
time establishing the scope of the provision. The article considers the test
laid out by the Singapore Income Tax Board of Review in IB v CIT,4 which pro-
vided that where a gain or proﬁt is made from the disposal of an asset, if
the asset was acquired with the intention of being held as a long-term
© 2019 Faculty of Law, Oxford University
CONTACT Vincent Ooi vincentooi@smu.edu.sg
1(Cap 134, 2014 Rev Ed).
2(Act 53) (1971 Rev Ed).
3The legal positions in Singapore and Malaysia are substantially similar and all references to the Singapore
position may be taken to apply to the Malaysian position as well. Where the two jurisdictions diverge,
express note will be made of it.
4IB v Comptroller of Income Tax [2004] SGITBR 10 (IB v CIT) (also reported as DWTH v The Comptroller of
Income Tax (2005) MSTC 5,347) (Singapore Income Tax Board of Review).
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investment, the gain or proﬁt would be a capital gain; otherwise, it would be
income.5 It argues that such a test only applies in speciﬁc situations where
gains or proﬁts are made from the disposal of an asset. A comprehensive
test capable of catching all instances of section 10(1)(g) income has not
been proposed in the jurisprudence so far and the scope of this article is
conﬁned to discussing a test for section 10(1)(g) income applicable only in
the speciﬁc situation where gains or proﬁts are made from the disposal of
an asset.
The article analyses the cases following IB v CIT, starting with HZ v CIT6
which followed shortly after. In GBU v CIT,7 the Income Tax Board of Review
(ITBR) reﬁned the IB v CIT test by clarifying that the concept of ‘long-term
investments’ is merely a safe harbour, and that all facts and circumstances
of the case must be considered in determining whether a gain or proﬁt is
section 10(1)(g) income.8 However, the board did not provide any guidance
as to what the other relevant facts and circumstances might be. In GCA &
GCB v CIT,9 the ITBR applied the IB v CIT test without any comment on the
‘safe harbour’ point mentioned in GBU v CIT. GCA & GCB v CIT was sub-
sequently appealed to the High Court in BQY v CIT,10 where once again
there was no mention of the ‘safe harbour’ point. At present, GBU v CIT
stands alone as the only case expressly stating that it is necessary to look
beyond the intention of the taxpayer at the point of acquisition and
whether he intended to hold the asset as a long-term investment.
The article argues that the ITBR’s reliance on Myer Emporium in IB v CIT was
misplaced due to the very diﬀerent statutory framework under which the Aus-
tralian case was decided. It submits that the test for ‘intention to hold as a
long-term investment’ did not in fact come from Myer Emporium, but
rather, was more likely to have originated from a line of Singapore prop-
erty-trader cases decided some years before IB v CIT. It is submitted that con-
sequently, ‘intention’ should only be one (albeit important) indicia amongst
others in the section 10(1)(g) test.
It goes on to argue for a modiﬁed Badges of Trade test, where all the
Badges of Trade (with the exception of ‘frequency’) would be applied in
section 10(1)(g) cases and submits that such an approach would be consistent
with the existing jurisprudence. Finally, the article cautions against a sole
focus on intention in the section 10(1)(g) test and emphasises the diﬀerences
between a receipt being assessed under section 10(1)(a) or (g).
5ibid [39]; HZ and another v Comptroller of Income Tax [2004] SGITBR 8 (HZ v CIT) (also reported as HZ B v
The Comptroller of Income Tax (2005) MSTC 5,508), [53].
6HZ v CIT (n 5).
7GBU v The Comptroller of Income Tax (2017) MSTC 50–028 (GBU v CIT).
8ibid [3].
9GCA & GCB v The Comptroller of Income Tax (2017) MSTC 50–030 (GCA & GCB v CIT).
10BQY and another v Comptroller of Income Tax [2018] 4 SLR 1467 (BQY v CIT).
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2. The heads of charge
2.1. Overview
Sections 10(1)(a)–(g) of the SITA (and sections 4(a)–(f) of the MITA) lay out the
six heads of charge, under which proﬁts or gains are liable to tax in Singapore
(and Malaysia):
(1) gains or proﬁts from any trade, business, profession or vocation, for what-
ever period of time such trade, business, profession or vocation may have
been carried on or exercised;
(2) gains or proﬁts from any employment;
(3) [Deleted by Act 29 of 65]
(4) dividends, interest or discounts;
(5) any pension, charge or annuity;
(6) rents, royalties, premiums and any other proﬁts arising from property; and
(7) any gains or proﬁts of an income nature not falling within any of the pre-
ceding paragraphs.
Proﬁts or gains which do not fall within any of the heads of charge in these
sections are not liable to tax. Section 10(1)(g) of the SITA is of particular inter-
est for two reasons: ﬁrstly, unlike the other heads of charge, which were
present from the inception of the statute, section 10(1)(g) was only sub-
sequently added11; secondly, the enactment of section 10(1)(g) had some
very signiﬁcant consequences.
2.2. The eﬀect of section 10(1)(g)
Section 10(1)(g) is a ‘sweeping-up’ provision that catches: ‘any gains or proﬁts
of an income nature not falling within any of the preceding paragraphs’.
Before the enactment of section 10(1)(g), the speciﬁc tests for section 10
(1)(a)–(f) income would be applied to determine whether a receipt was
income in nature. If a receipt could not be classiﬁed as income under any
of the speciﬁc tests for the various heads of charge, it would simply not be
taxable as income. Two kinds of receipts would thus not be subject to
income tax: one, capital receipts; and two, income receipts which did not
fall under sections 10(1)(a)–(f).
The enactment of section 10(1)(g) changed this position and rendered all
income taxable, notwithstanding that it might not ﬁt into any of the other
heads of charge.12 The eﬀect was that all the heads of charge in section 10
(1) collectively cover all income, with the result that only gains or proﬁts in
11In 1965 for Singapore and in 1967 for Malaysia.
12For the equivalent provision in Malaysia, see section 4(f) of the MITA.
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the nature of capital gains are not liable to tax in Singapore. The stark contrast
in tax treatment of income and capital gains has naturally made the classiﬁ-
cation of a proﬁt or gain under either category an issue of great concern to
both taxpayers and the Revenue authorities.13
3. Section 10(1)(g)
3.1. The history of section 10(1)(g)
While sections 10(1)(a)–(f) of the SITA can be traced back to the Model
Income Tax Ordinance14 which formed the basis of the income tax legis-
lation of many of the British colonies at the time (and on which Singapore
based its 1947 Income Tax Ordinance), section 10(1)(g) was only added to
the SITA much later, in 1965. Khattar argues that it was the decision of the
Singapore Court of Appeal in DEF v CIT15 that led to the enactment of
section 10(1)(g).16
3.1.1. DEF v CIT
In DEF v CIT, the taxpayer borrowed money to purchase a rubber estate and
promptly resold it at a proﬁt within three weeks. The question before the Sin-
gapore Court of Appeal was whether such an isolated transaction could fall
within the ambit of section 10(1)(a). Section 10(1)(a) taxes ‘gains or proﬁts
from any trade, business, profession or vocation’. In ﬁnding for the taxpayer,
Buttrose J held that the terms ‘trade’, ‘profession’, ‘vocation’ and ‘business’ all
‘connote habitual and systematic operations, a continuity or repetition of acts
or similar operations’.17 He went on to add that ‘[t]he term “business” as used
in the section does not apply to one isolated act; it does not mean a “business
transaction”’.18 Ambrose J was of a similar view, holding that the fundamental
idea behind the four activities listed in section 10(1)(a) was ‘the continuous
exercise of an activity’19 and that a business must be ‘carried on’ for the
proﬁt generated to be taxable. In this context, Ambrose J held that ‘carried
on’ implies a ‘repetition or series of acts’.20
13The anonymous referee has very helpfully commented that in the UK, the bulk of cases seeking to dis-
tinguish between income and capital largely predate the introduction of capital gains tax in 1965.
14Inter-Departmental Committee on Income Tax, ‘Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Income
Tax in the Colonies Not Possessing Responsible Government’ (His Majesty’s Stationary Oﬃce, 1922) 19.
The current section 10 of the SITA was renumbered from the original section 5 of the Ordinance.
15DEF v Comptroller of Income Tax [1961] Malayan Law Journal 55 (DEF v CIT).
16Sat Pal Khattar, ‘Tax Systems and Laws of Singapore’ [1981] 2 Malayan Law Journal xlvii, xlviii. Khattar
was an oﬃcer of the Inland Revenue Department at the material time and is likely to be right. However,
this is uncertain. See Soon Choo Hock, ‘Taxation of Trade and Business Income’ [1986] 2 Malayan Law
Journal clix, clxxviii.
17DEF v CIT (n 15) 59.
18ibid.
19ibid 61.
20ibid.
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Following the decision in DEF v CIT, it was diﬃcult to argue that a single
isolated transaction constituted trading.21 On the other hand, it might be
possible to classify it as an adventure in the nature of trade.22 However,
under Singapore law (and Malaysian law before 1967), gains from an adven-
ture in the nature of trade are not taxable.23 It appears that this position was
thought to be unsatisfactory in both Singapore and Malaysia, for section 10
(1)(g) was enacted in Singapore about ﬁve years after the decision.24 Malaysia
waited six years after the decision to enact its equivalent provision: section 4(f)
of the MITA. However, the MITA went further by modifying the deﬁnition of
‘business’ to include a ‘profession, vocation and trade and every manufacture,
adventure or concern in the nature of trade’. As such, adventures in the nature
of trade are taxable under section 4(a) (of the MITA) in Malaysia but not under
section 10(1)(a) in Singapore.
3.2. The nature of section 10(1)(g)
Section 10(1)(g) is drafted in an exclusionary manner. It catches all income
unless the income falls under any other head of charge in section 10(1). Con-
ceptually, a test which is to accurately determine whether a gain or proﬁt
is in the nature of section 10(1)(g) income must therefore require one to
ﬁrst determine: ﬁrst, whether a gain or proﬁt is in the nature of ‘General
Income’ (used here to refer to income as a general concept, not speciﬁcally
classiﬁed as income falling under the diﬀerent heads of income); and
second, whether a gain or proﬁt falls under any other head of charge in
section 10(1). As will be seen from the existing jurisprudence on section 10
(1)(g), this is not the approach which the courts have adopted in Singapore,
though it has been adopted by the Privy Council in the sole case decided at
Malaysian law.
It is noted that all the cases on section 10(1)(g) decided in Singapore and
Malaysia to date are cases involving the disposal of assets for a proﬁt or gain.
There is nothing in section 10(1)(g) that conﬁnes its application to such cases.
However, this article will engage with the existing jurisprudence and conﬁne
21The anonymous referee has helpfully highlighted that several English cases suggest that an isolated
transaction can be understood as forming part of a trade as a venture in the nature of trade (see CIR
v Fraser [1942] SC 493 (Scottish Court of Session (CS)) and CIR v Livingston [1927] SC 251 (CS)). Thus,
it might be arguable that the Court of Appeal in DEF v CIT took a narrow approach to the interpretation
of the statute, distinguishing between a trade and adventures in the nature of trade.
22Indeed, this appears to be the conclusion subsequently arrived at by the Malaysian Federal Court in
Director-General of Inland Revenue v CKK [1974] 2 Malayan Law Journal 104 and E v Comptroller-
General of Inland Revenue [1970] 2 Malayan Law Journal 117. See also Liu Hern Kuan, ‘Income Taxation
of Isolated Property Transactions in Singapore’ (1994) 6 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 96.
23DEF v CIT (n 15) 61.
24Counsel for the Revenue authorities in HZ v CIT (n 5), submitted that this ﬁve-year time gap was a con-
sequence of the turbulent nature of the period between 1961 and 1965, and that 1965 was the earliest
available opportunity for Parliament to amend the legislation (see [36]).
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its analysis of section 10(1)(g) to cases involving the disposal of assets for a
proﬁt or gain. While a comprehensive test capable of catching all instances
of section 10(1)(g) income requires the determination of the two factors dis-
cussed above (General Income and the other heads of charge), a court consid-
ering the speciﬁc situation of the disposal of assets for a proﬁt or gain does not
have to apply the comprehensive test. There is a possibility that there may be
a test that can catch section 10(1)(g) income in the context of the disposal of
assets for a proﬁt or gain that has a very diﬀerent formulation. Indeed, such an
alternative formulation appears to have been considered by the courts in Sin-
gapore and Malaysia.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that any such test cannot breach two funda-
mental principles as laid out in the express wording of section 10(1)(g): ﬁrst,
the test cannot catch gains or proﬁts which are not income in nature; and
second, the test cannot catch gains or proﬁts which fall under any other
head of charge in section 10(1).
3.3. Determining the scope of section 10(1)(g)
For a long time, the exact scope of section 10(1)(g) of the SITA was a matter of
speculation, with no fewer than four authors in Singapore writing on this
issue.25 While the ﬁrst case on section 10(1)(g) of the SITA would only be
heard in 2004, the Malaysian equivalent, section 4(f) of the MITA, was judicially
considered in 1985, when the case of M v DGIR26 came before the Privy
Council.
3.3.1. M v DGIR
The case involved a taxpayer engaged in the business of cultivating oil palms.
To develop land into an oil palm plantation, it was necessary to clear the
land of timber, which the taxpayer duly sold. The question before the Privy
Council was whether the receipts from the sale of timber were in the nature
of income.
Their Lordships rejected the ﬁnding of the Special Commissioners that
there had been two separate and distinct activities, the extraction and sale
of timber from the land and the development of the land as a palm oil planta-
tion.27 Further, they held that the taxpayer was not carrying on a business of
timber operators.28 Finally, in considering the applicability of section 4(f) of
the MITA, the Privy Council held that:
25See Khattar (n 16) xlviii; Soon (n 16) clxxix–clxxx; Liu (n 22) 114–15; Teo Keang Sood, ‘Badges of Trade
Revisited’ (1996) 43 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 43, 51.
26M Sendirian Berhad v Director General of Inland Revenue (1950–1985) Malaysia and Singapore Tax Cases
68 (M v DGIR).
27ibid 73.
28ibid.
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[T]he receipts in question are properly to be regarded as having a capital and not
an income character. The timber…was part of a capital asset which the tax-
payer acquired by payment of a capital sum. It expended further capital sums
on the development of the land, and in mitigation of that expenditure it realised
and disposed of timber which formed part of its original capital asset.29
Unfortunately, this decision of the Privy Council sheds very little light on the
scope of section 4(f) of the MITA. The test applied by their Lordships was
drawn from precedents30 which dealt with the distinction between trade/
business income and capital gains. There was therefore no speciﬁc guidance
on how a test for section 4(f) income might be applied.
However, it is submitted that the Privy Council did get the fundamental
concept of the mechanism of section 4(f) right. As noted above, given the
nature of section 4(f) as a sweeping-up clause, in order to be assessed under
section 4(f), the receipts must not fall under any other head of charge. The
Privy Council addressed the possibility that the receipts were trade/business
income (it being obvious that the receipts could not fall under any other
head of charge).31 Having determined that the receipts could only either be
section 4(f) income or capital in nature, they then applied a test to classify
the receipts.32 As noted above, the test applied by the Privy Council was not
a general test for section 4(f) income, but merely a speciﬁc test for the situation
where there was a disposal of assets for a proﬁt or gain.
3.3.2. IB v CIT
In Singapore, the ﬁrst application of section 10(1)(g) arose in IB v CIT. The case
involved an individual who had purchased and sold three properties within a
year, with the gains being assessed to tax under section 10(1)(g). The taxpayer
argued that given the ‘mischief’ which section 10(1)(g) was enacted to
counter, it should apply to transactions that would otherwise be regarded
as adventures in the nature of trade.33 The Revenue authorities, on the
other hand, submitted that section 10(1)(g) should not be so restrained,
citing the speech of the Minister at the Second Reading of the Bill that intro-
duced section 10(1)(g) as follows: ‘the new provision is introduced to enlarge
the scope of charging provisions, rendering liable to tax miscellaneous form of
income in respect of which no speciﬁc provision now exists’.34 The ITBR
clariﬁed the position, holding that there was ‘nothing in the Parliamentary
materials to suggest that section 10(1)(g) was enacted solely to address the
outcome in DEF v CIT’, and instead endorsing a literal reading of the
29ibid.
30See the Van Den Berghs Ltd v Clark 19 TC 390 (House of Lords); and Glenboig Union Fireclay Co Ltd v CIR 12
TC 427 (CS) line of cases.
31M v DGIR (n 26) 74.
32ibid.
33IB v CIT (n 4) [27]–[28].
34ibid [29].
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section.35 As such, there was no need for the ITBR to address the question of
whether the taxpayer’s actions in this case amounted to an adventure in the
nature of trade.
As noted above, the plain language of section 10(1)(g) does not conﬁne its
application to cases of the disposal of assets for a gain or proﬁt. This is in line
with the ITBR’s similar ﬁnding that the section should not be so conﬁned.
However, it should be noted that the case before the ITBR in IB v CIT was
one of the disposal of assets for a gain or proﬁt. Thus, there is a need to care-
fully analyse the test applied by the honourable Board to see if it is capable of
general application in catching all instances of section 10(1)(g) income, or
whether it can only apply in cases where there has been the disposal of
assets for a gain or proﬁt.
4. The test in IB v CIT
4.1. A comprehensive test for section 10(1)(g) income?
In IB v CIT, the ITBR started oﬀ by considering one of the key factors for a com-
prehensive test for section 10(1)(g) income that would apply in all situations:
the test for General Income. This was not an easy task, for it has never been
easy to pin down a precise deﬁnition of ‘income’. In fact, the term may be
somewhat of a moving target; as explained by Jordan CJ in Scott v COT as
follows:
The word ‘income’ is not a term of art, and what forms of receipts are compre-
hended within it, and what principles are to be applied to ascertain howmuch of
those receipts ought to be treated as income, must be determined in accord-
ance with the ordinary concepts and usages of mankind.36
As it happened, the ITBR deﬁned ‘income’ as encompassing ‘the amount of
money or its equivalent received during a period of time in exchange for
labour or services, from the sale of goods or property, or as proﬁt from
ﬁnancial investments’.37
While conceptually, the ITBR was correct to start oﬀ with setting out the
concept of income, the deﬁnition given was more a list of some common cat-
egories of income than an actual comprehensive deﬁnition of General
Income. With great respect to the honourable Board, the deﬁnition is
35ibid [31]–[32]. The same reasoning was also applied in HZ v CIT (n 5) [42]–[43]. It is noted that it is now
clear that section 10(1)(g) includes more than adventures in the nature of a trade. Several sections in the
SITA expressly deem certain kinds of income to be section 10(1)(g) income (e.g. withdrawals from Sup-
plementary Retirement Scheme (section 10L) and deduction for upfront land premium (section 14N
(7)(b))).
36Scott v Commissioner of Taxation (1935) 35 State Reports (New South Wales) 215, 219. For a more in-
depth discussion on this area, see John Brooks, ‘The Deﬁnitions of Income’ (2018) 71 Tax Law Review
253.
37IB v CIT (n 4) [33], cited with approval in HZ v CIT (n 5) [44].
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unfortunately both under and over-inclusive. At ﬁrst glance, it is apparent that
the categories of income cannot be so conﬁned. For instance, rents arising
from property (as caught by section 10(1)(f)) do not seem to be caught by
this deﬁnition. In fairness to the ITBR, it did use the term ‘encompassing’,
making it clear that the deﬁnition was by no means exhaustive.
However, this deﬁnition of ‘income’ appears to be capable of catching capital
gains as well. A gain from the sale of a property may in some circumstances be
considered to be in the nature of capital gains. Yet, following this deﬁnition of
‘income’ such a gain would appear to be considered to be ‘income’ regardless
of the circumstances of its realisation. While the ITBR in IB v CIT stated that ‘the
words ‘gains or proﬁts of an income nature’would preclude capital gains arising
from the disposal of long-term investments from being taxed under section 10
(1)(g)’,38 the deﬁnition of ‘income’ as being capable of including categories of
gains that would traditionally be considered to be in the nature of capital
gains means that no such preclusion can be implied. It is thus humbly sub-
mitted that the deﬁnition of ‘income’ propounded by the honourable Board
cannot serve as a comprehensive deﬁnition of income.
It does not appear, however, that the ITBR relied on its deﬁnition of income
when determining the case in IB v CIT. Nor did it consider whether the gains or
proﬁts in question were capable of falling under any of the other heads of
charge in section 10(1). It would thus seem that the ITBR did not apply a com-
prehensive test for section 10(1)(g) income that would apply in all situations.
4.2. A speciﬁc test for section 10(1)(g) income?
The test which the ITBR did eventually apply in IB v CIT appears to be one that
is speciﬁc to the context of disposal of assets for a gain or proﬁt. The honour-
able Board laid out the test as follows: ‘gains from ‘extraordinary’ isolated
transactions may constitute income where the taxpayer had the requisite
intention to make a proﬁt or gain before entering into the transaction’39
(ﬁrst limb). Further, the ITBR stated that ‘[o]n the facts of [that] case, unless
the Appellant proves that the gains were made by him on the disposal of
properties that were acquired with the intention of being held by him as
long-term investments, this appeal fails’40 (second limb).
4.2.1. Analysing the speciﬁc test
4.2.1.1. The wording of the test. It is necessary to read the test very carefully.
With respect to the ﬁrst limb, while the ITBR clearly placed great importance
on the intention of the taxpayer, it did not state that intention was to be the
38ibid [39], cited with approval in HZ v CIT (n 5) [53].
39ibid [38], cited with approval in HZ v CIT (n 5) [53].
40ibid [39], cited with approval in HZ v CIT (n 5) [53].
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sole factor to be considered. Rather, the ITBR stated that ‘gains from ‘extraordi-
nary’ isolated transactions may constitute income where the taxpayer had the
requisite intention to make a proﬁt or gain before entering into the trans-
action’.41 The couching of the test in terms of the possible rather than the
absolute suggests that other factors may yet displace the ﬁnding that the
gains are income in nature, even if the taxpayer had the requisite intention.
With respect to the second limb, the requirement for the taxpayer to
provide that he intended to hold the properties as long-term investments
needs to be read in context. The ITBR did state that
[o]n the facts of [that] case, unless the Appellant proves that the gains were
made by him on the disposal of properties that were acquired with the intention
of being held by him as long-term investments, this appeal fails.42
The use of the qualiﬁer at the start of the sentence suggests that this state-
ment was speciﬁc to the case and not intended for general application.
Read carefully in this manner, it appears that the ITBR was not setting out
these two statements as the conclusive tests for section 10(1)(g) income.
Rather, the ﬁrst limb established the primacy of intention over other factors
(which were not listed). The second limb is less a test than a conclusion on
the facts of the IB v CIT case that given the evidence before the ITBR, only
proof that the properties were intended to be held as long-term investments
would convince the Board that the gains were not in the nature of income.
The need to read the test in IB v CIT carefully becomes apparent when we
consider the arguments of counsel for the Revenue authorities in GBU v CIT,
where it submitted that the test for section 10(1)(g) income:
is two-pronged: ﬁrst, if the Appellant had an intention to proﬁt from the trans-
action at the time the transaction was entered into, the gain derived from the
transaction would prima facie be taxable under section 10(1)(g) of the Act;
and second, only if the Appellant satisﬁed the Board that the acquisition was
intended to be held as a long-term investment, the gain would then be con-
sidered a non-taxable capital gain.43
Further, in GCA & GCB v CIT, the parties agreed that ‘the core issue in these
appeals is whether the Appellants had at the time of the acquisition of
each of the Properties an intention to derive a gain or proﬁt from the disposal
of each of the Properties’.44 These statements appear to suggest that the test
for section 10(1)(g) is predominantly (if not exclusively) based on the intention
of the taxpayer, whereas a careful reading of IB v CIT, which these statements
are purportedly based on, makes no claim that the section 10(1)(g) test should
be so limited.
41ibid [38], cited with approval in HZ v CIT (n 5) [53] (emphasis added).
42ibid [39], cited with approval in HZ v CIT (n 5) [53] (emphasis added).
43GBU v CIT (n 7), [2].
44GCA & GCB v CIT (n 9), [11].
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4.2.1.2. Subsequent application of the test. It was submitted above that the
statements on the taxpayer’s intention laid out by the ITBR in IB v CIT and HZ v
CIT are not conclusive tests for section 10(1)(g) income, but rather parts of a
wider test. Support for this proposition can be derived from GBU v CIT,
where the ITBR clariﬁed that:
Although the cases of IB and HZ only identify the concept of ‘long-term invest-
ments’ as being an exception to the rule, we do not take this to mean that if the
Appellant is unable to prove that the acquisition is for the purposes of a long-
term investment, it must necessarily mean that the gain derived from the sub-
sequent sale is a taxable income gain … the second stage of the test must be
broader than merely long-term investments to also encompass ‘other capital
purposes depending on the context’.45
The board then went on to characterise the concept of ‘long-term invest-
ments’ as a ‘safe harbour which would satisfy the Board that the gain was
capital in nature, but does not automatically render a gain derived
without the intention to hold the purchase as a long-term investment as
being an income gain’.46 This clariﬁcation manifestly accords with
common sense, given that most, if not all, people who make investments
intend to someday realise them at a proﬁt.47 While this is a welcome clariﬁ-
cation, it should be noted that these statements of the ITBR are strictly obiter
dicta, given that the decision did not turn on the legal test to be applied.
Rather, the key question before the Board was whether the taxpayer
intended to hold the shares as long-term investments.48 The clariﬁcation
in GBU v CIT does not provide any authoritative guidance on what the full
test for section 10(1)(g) income is. At most, it acknowledges that the test
for section 10(1)(g) is broader than merely the intention of the taxpayer.
No further mention of the clariﬁcation of the ITBR in GBU v CIT was made in
the subsequent case of GCA & GCB v CIT, nor in its appeal before the High
Court in BQY v CIT. However, if indeed the case, as will be submitted below,
that the ‘intention to hold as a long-term investment’ concept has its
origins in the Singapore case law on property traders, then the clariﬁcation
of the ITBR in GBU v CIT is likely to be correct. In all three property trader
cases (discussed below), the ITBR clearly stated the need to take into
account all the surrounding circumstances.49 The ‘intention to hold as a
long-term investment’ test was not the sole determinative factor of
whether the proﬁts from the sale of the assets were income in nature.
45GBU v CIT (n 7), [3].
46ibid.
47See Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Reinhold (1953) TC 389, 397; Leeming v Jones 15 TC 333, 357.
48GBU v CIT (n 7) [3] and [10].
49SCL Pte Ltd v Comptroller of Income Tax (1991) 1 MSTC 5,032 (one block of ﬂats); W Holdings Private
Limited v The Comptroller of Income Tax (1992) 1 MSTC5,135 (two properties); GRP Ltd v Comptroller
of Income Tax (1995) 2 MSTC 5,207 (one hotel).
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4.3. The origins of the speciﬁc test
4.3.1. A detour down under
That the speciﬁc test in IB v CIT makes reference to the intention of the tax-
payer is rather curious; after all, nowhere in section 10(1)(g) is the intention
of the taxpayer expressly referred to. Looking carefully at the reasoning of
the ITBR in IB v CIT, it appears that the Australian case of Myer Emporium50
was the source of this reference to the intention of the taxpayer. In fact, the
ITBR in IB v CIT cites a portion of the Myer Emporium judgment, in particular
emphasising that:
if circumstances are such as to give rise to the inference that the taxpayer’s
intention or purpose in entering into the transaction was to make a proﬁt or
gain, the proﬁt or gain will be income, notwithstanding that the transaction
was extraordinary judged by reference to the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s
business.51
4.3.1.1. It was incorrect to apply the reasoning in Myer Emporium. It is
necessary to understand the context in which the judgment of the Full
High Court of Australia in Myer Emporium was made. Australia does not
have an exact equivalent to Singapore’s section 10(1)(g). Rather, the Myer
Emporium decision was made based on an interpretation of section 26(a) of
the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (AITAA), which reads
as follows:
The assessable income of a taxpayer shall include- (a) proﬁt arising from the sale
by the taxpayer of any property acquired by him for the purpose of proﬁtmaking
by sale, or from the carrying on or carrying out of any proﬁt-making undertaking
or scheme.
The focus inMyer Emporium on the intention of the taxpayer can be attributed
to the language of section 26(a) of the AITAA, which makes reference to the
concept of ‘purpose’. As such, the decision in Myer Emporium was arguably
reached through the application of an Australian statutory provision rather
than a common law principle. The ITBR’s reliance on the Myer Emporium
decision does appear misplaced since section 26(a) of the AITAA and
section 10(1)(g) of the SITA are not in pari materia.
It is noted that the AITAA does have a ‘sweeping-up’ provision in section 25
(1), which provides that: ‘The assessable income of a taxpayer shall include: (a)
where the taxpayer is a resident: the gross income derived directly or
indirectly from all sources whether in or out of Australia… ’ Section 25(1) of
the AITAA diﬀers from section 10(1)(g) of the SITA in that, unlike the latter,
the former catches all income without expressly excluding income taxable
50Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium (1985) 8 FCR 136.
51IB v CIT (n 4) [37], citing Myer Emporium (n 50) 41. The same citation is made in HZ v CIT (n 5) [46].
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under another head of charge. Thus, under the AITAA, income could be exigi-
ble to tax under either section 25(1) or section 26(a). Indeed, this was the con-
clusion reached by the Australian Full High Court in Myer Emporium, which
held that:
What we have said leads to the conclusion that the amount in question formed
part of the income of Myer under s. 25(1) of the Act. A similar chain of reasoning
would have led to the conclusion that the amount constituted assessable
income under the second limb of s. 26(a)…we consider that the amount in
question in the present appeal constituted income of the taxpayer both pur-
suant to ss. 25(1) and 26(a).52
It thus appears that the Australian Full High Court ﬁrst decided whether the
income was exigible to tax under a generalised tax provision (section 25(1)
of the AITAA), before considering whether the income would alternatively
be taxable under an overlapping charging provision (section 26(a) of the
AITAA). Quite apart from the fact that the statutory framework under the
AITAA seems to be very diﬀerent from that under the SITA, there is no refer-
ence to ‘purpose’ or ‘intention’ in section 25(1) of the AITAA, which would
arguably be the provision in the AITAA most similar to section 10(1)(g) of
the SITA.
But even if section 10(1)(g) of the SITA and section 26(a) of the AITAA were
in pari materia, there are diﬃculties with applying the principle laid down in
Myer Emporium to the interpretation of section 10(1)(g). Tang has noted
that ‘none of the three key Australian cases leading up to, and including,
Myer Emporium were concerned with a taxpayer who would come within
the purported scope of section 10(1)(g)’.53
It is submitted that conceptually, we can distinguish between two kinds of
situations. In the ﬁrst, there is an existing business, but a gain is made outside
the normal operation of such existing business. In the second, a gain is made
where there is no other business or trade activity to speak of. Crucially, inMyer
Emporium, the taxpayer was carrying on a business and made a gain that was
not in the ordinary course of business.54 In other words, it falls within the ﬁrst
situation and was not at all like the situations in IB v CIT and HZ v CIT, where
the taxpayers did not carry on any other business from which the gain arose.
In any case, the test for the ﬁrst situation appears to have been laid out by
the Singapore Court of Appeal in the case of BBO v CIT.55 In that case, an insur-
ance company had acquired certain ‘core shares’ as part of their ‘corporate
52Myer Emporium (n 50) 41.
53See Tang Siau Yan, ‘Receipts’ in Pok Soy Yoong, Ng Keat Seng and Steven Timms (eds) The Law and
Practice of Singapore Income Tax (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2013) 354. The three cases are Scottish Australian
Mining Company Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1950) 81 CLR 188, Federal Commissioner of
Taxation v Whitfords Beach Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 355, and Myer Emporium itself.
54ibid 354.
55Comptroller of Income Tax v BBO [2014] 2 SLR 609 (CA) (BBO v CIT (CA)).
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preservation strategy’. The core shares were acquired with the intention of
holding them indeﬁnitely so as to preserve the corporate structure of the
group of companies it was a part of and aﬀord a defence mechanism
against any potential hostile takeover of any of the companies in the
group. Eventually, the group accepted a takeover oﬀer, following which
they sold the core shares. The question for the courts was whether the
gains made from the sale of the core shares were in the nature of income.
At the High Court,56 Lai Siu Chiu J held that: ‘the factors relevant to the analy-
sis of whether the Core Shares are capital assets, and, hence, whether any
gains from the disposal of the Core Shares are capital and not income in
nature, understandably overlap with some of the factors listed as the
“badges of trade”’.57 Lai J’s general approach was aﬃrmed by the Court of
Appeal, which came to the same conclusion that the gains from the disposal
of the shares were capital gains.58 Crucially, in BBO v CIT, the courts were of the
view that the gains from the disposal of the shares, if income in nature, would
be section 10(1)(a) and not section 10(1)(g) income.
It is submitted that there are similarities between BBO v CIT and the Myer
Emporium line of cases in Australia. In each case, it was not possible to estab-
lish that the activity outside the normal operation of an existing business
which generated the gains or proﬁts was a separate trade in itself.
However, it was clear that some link between those gains or proﬁts and the
core business could be established. As BBO v CIT is a Singapore Court of
Appeal decision, it is submitted that it is untenable to apply the Myer Empor-
ium test any longer. It is admitted that this is a novel reading of BBO v CIT and
that further research might proﬁtably be done in this area, though that is
beyond the scope of this article. In any case, it is submitted that the clear
diﬀerences between section 10(1)(g) of the SITA and section 26(a) of the
AITAA are suﬃcient to establish that it was incorrect to apply Myer Emporium
in IB v CIT.
4.3.2. Intention to hold as a long-term investment: taxation of isolated
property transactions in Singapore
While the ITBR in IB v CIT and HZ v CIT cited Myer Emporium in support of the
test they applied,59 there seems to be considerable diﬀerences between
section 26(a) of the AITAA and the test applied by the ITBR. Rather, the
language of the test laid out by the ITBR has an uncanny similarity to a line
of Singapore property-trader cases decided some years before IB v CIT and
56Comptroller of Income Tax v BBO [2013] 3 SLR 36 (HC) (BBO v CIT (HC)). The case was an appeal from the
decision of the ITBR, where it was reported as U Limited v The Comptroller of Income Tax (2012) MSTC 50-
010.
57ibid [32].
58BBO v CIT (CA) (n 55).
59IB v CIT (n 4) [37], citing Myer Emporium (n 50) 41. The same citation is made in HZ v CIT (n 5) [46].
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HZ v CIT. Liu has analysed three such cases60 and submitted that the common
factor in the cases was the ﬁnding of the ITBR that the taxpayers had no inten-
tion of holding the properties as long-term investments.61 He goes on to con-
clude that the three cases establish that:
[T]axability of gains arising from property transactions will depend on whether
the property was sold soon after purchase and whether the seller had the inten-
tion, at the time of purchase, to hold the property as a long term investment or
not. If the seller did not have this intention, the property would be subject to tax
chargeable under section 10(l)(a).62
If one considers that the concept of ‘intention to hold as a long-term invest-
ment’ is present in both the case law relating to property traders and that of
section 10(1)(g), and the similarity of the assets involved and activities of the tax-
payers in both kinds of cases, one might quite reasonably surmise that the ITBR
in IB v CIT drew on the Singapore case law relating to property traders when
crafting the section 10(1)(g) test. However, it must be noted that the property
traders’ cases involved the assessment of section 10(1)(a) income and that
therefore, the Badges of Trade test applied. The section 10(1)(g) test must there-
fore be read in the context of the application of the Badges of Trade test, as
being only one (albeit important) indicia amongst others. Even if we accept
that section 10(1)(a) and section 10(1)(g) are diﬀerent, it is hard to think of a
good conceptual reason for focusing on the intention of the taxpayer at the
point of acquisition of the asset and ignoring all the other Badges of Trade.
It must be emphasised that the honourable Board in IB v CIT delivered an
exceptional judgment which has provided subsequent Boards with a (reason-
ably) practical test. As noted above, the deﬁnition of ‘income’ is notoriously
diﬃcult to pin down and the honourable Board should be lauded for oﬀering
a deﬁnition that is substantially correct in the majority of situations. It should
be remembered that in an adversarial system, the courts largely have to work
with the authorities submitted by counsel, and in this case there was a complete
absence of any directly applicable authorities, local or otherwise.
4.3.3. The context of the IB v CIT decision
It should be noted that in IB v CIT, the taxpayer had refused to testify before
the ITBR, resulting in the non-admission of his aﬃdavit of evidence.63 Given
that the burden of proving that an assessment is excessive is on the tax-
payer,64 the taxpayer failed to discharge his burden and the Revenue auth-
orities won the case. Given that the case was essentially determined on an
60SCL (n 49); W Holding (n 49); GRP Ltd (n 49).
61Liu (n 22) 107.
62ibid 116.
63IB v CIT (n 4) [42].
64See section 80(4) of the SITA, as applied by CEC v Comptroller of Income Tax [1971–73] SLR(R) 76 [9] and
[23]–[24], and PQR v The Comptroller of Income Tax, Singapore [1961] MLJ 273.
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issue of the burden of proof, it is perhaps unsatisfactory from an academic
perspective, for it does not strongly aﬃrm any legal principle.
5. A need for a new test?
5.1. A modiﬁed badges of trade test
If, as argued above, the speciﬁc test in IB v CIT rests on shaky foundations, the
question remains as to what should replace it. This article argues for the adop-
tion of a modiﬁed version of the Badges of Trade. The Badges of Trade are a
set of indicia that help one to determine the existence of a trade. Crucially,
they are applied in situations where the disposal of assets results in proﬁts
or gains (or, inversely, losses). It might then be argued that a modiﬁed
version of the Badges of Trade might similarly shine some light on whether,
in the speciﬁc context of disposal of assets, the resultant proﬁts or gains are
in the nature of General Income. Conceptually, this involves removing from
the Badges of Trade all factors that are indicators of trade which are not
also independently indicators of income.
It is argued that of the Badges of Trade, it is only the frequency of trans-
action which is a factor which is solely used to determine the presence of a
trade, but is not necessarily indicative of income. For example, as has been dis-
cussed in several cases,65 a single isolated transaction may give rise to a gain
or proﬁt in the nature of income. Therefore, frequency of transaction may be
an indicator of trade but it is not also independently an indicator of income. In
other words, the modiﬁed Badges of Trade are almost exactly the same as the
Badges of Trade, with the exception of ‘frequency’, which is not present in the
former. If frequency is the only factor distinguishing trade income from
general income, it may be argued that income in this context (of gains or
proﬁts from the disposal of assets) can exhaustively be divided into income
from trade and income from adventures in the nature of a trade.66 This
may go some way to explaining why Malaysia, which taxes income from
adventures in the nature of a trade, has had only one reported case involving
section 4(f) of the MITA.
5.2. Fitting the test into the existing jurisprudence
A modiﬁed Badges of Trade test need not necessarily be incompatible with
the existing jurisprudence. The speciﬁc test thus far has focused on ‘intention’
but it would appear that the analysis need not be so conﬁned. Indeed, the
65Liu (n 22).
66The traditional deﬁnition of ‘an adventure in the nature of trade’ is that of ‘[a] pecuniary risk, a venture, a
speculation, a commercial enterprise.’ See Johnston (Inspector of Taxes) v Heath [1970] 3 All ER 915, 922
(UK Chancery Division), citing Barry v Cordy (Inspector of Taxes) [1946] 2 All ER 396, 398 (Scott LJ) (UK
Court of Appeal).
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ITBR in GBU v CIT noted that the section 10(1)(g) test as it currently is may be
incomplete. It stated that ‘[a]ll the facts and circumstances of the case must be
considered’.67 In the consideration of such ‘facts and circumstances’, a frame-
work (the modiﬁed Badges of Trade) may well be a useful tool for the courts. A
common framework would have the additional beneﬁt of expressly laying out
the factors to be considered in all cases, enabling parity of treatment in that
each case coming before the ITBR would be decided based on the same set of
factors. This too was one of the reasons listed in the Royal Commission Report
for the Badges of Trade.68
Of all the section 10(1)(g) cases decided in Singapore so far, it appears that
exactly half of the cases make reference to some factors which are present in
the Badges of Trade. In HZ v CIT69 and GBU v CIT,70 the ITBR considered the
method of ﬁnancing and the length of the period of ownership as relevant
factors in applying the section 10(1)(g) test. IB v CIT and GCA and GCB v CIT
focus solely on the intention of the taxpayer and do not refer to any of the
Badges of Trade.
The clearest indication that the Singapore courts apply some of the Badges
of Trade can be found in BQY v CIT, where Choo J held as follows:
The matter is to be decided by a determination of the buyer’s intention at the
time he purchased the property. But how does one ascertain his intention?
When parties disagree as to what the true intention of a person was, the
court as a ﬁnder of fact, can only look at the action or conduct of that person
and see on the balance of probabilities, whether the conduct was more consist-
ent with one intention or the other.71
It would thus appear that the Singapore courts, on some occasions at least,
have found it diﬃcult to directly ascertain the intention of the taxpayer and
have resorted to applying some Badges of Trade factors in an attempt to
assist them in ascertaining such intention. It seems that in such cases, the
courts ultimately still determine the taxpayer’s intentions and decide the
case on that ﬁnding. However, application of some of the Badges of Trade
do assist the courts in arriving at that ﬁnding of fact.
This arguably means that the modiﬁed Badges of Trade test might ﬁt nicely
into the existing jurisprudence. If the Singapore courts have been willing to
apply some of the Badges of Trade to determine the intention of the taxpayer
(the original purpose of the Badges of Trade) in section 10(1)(g) cases, there is
nothing inconsistent with going a step further and recognising that the
Badges of Trade (with the exception of ‘frequency’) may all be applied
67GBU v CIT (n 7) [3].
68Royal Commission on the Taxation of Proﬁts and Income, ‘Final Report of the Royal Commission on the
Taxation of Proﬁts and Income’ (His Majesty’s Stationary Oﬃce 1955) [116] (Royal Commission).
69HZ v CIT (n 5) [61].
70GBU v CIT (n 7) [4] and [8].
71BQY v CIT (n 10) [6].
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(where appropriate) to determine if gains or proﬁts from the disposal of assets
are in the nature of section 10(1)(g) income.
6. A diﬀerent interpretation of the speciﬁc test
While it may be argued that the modiﬁed Badges of Trade test might be con-
sistent with the existing jurisprudence, that is contingent on the courts being
willing to accept that the speciﬁc test is broad enough to allow for the use of
some of the Badges of Trade to help determine the intention of the taxpayer.
If the courts continue to solely focus on the intention of the taxpayer when
testing for section 10(1)(g) (which, it is humbly suggested, is untenable in
light of the foregoing discussion), then there will be major implications for
how capital and income receipts are classiﬁed.
6.1. Against a sole focus on intention
It is somewhat counterintuitive that there are at least six commonly applied
Badges of Trade (Teo has proposed another ﬁve)72 for testing for section 10
(1)(a) income, while it seems, only one indicium (which is intention) for
testing for section 10(1)(g) income. In practice, the sole focus on intention
in section 10(1)(g) is likely to deprive the court of a framework on which to
determine the intention of the taxpayer. The availability of a framework for
the courts has the beneﬁt of encouraging parity of treatment in each case
coming before the ITBR.73 Further, it has already been noted above that of
all the section 10(1)(g) cases decided in Singapore so far, it appears that
exactly half of the cases make reference to some factors which are present
in the Badges of Trade. Thus, arguably, the Singapore courts would appear
to have, on some occasions at least, found it diﬃcult to directly ascertain
the intention of the taxpayer and have resorted to applying some of the
Badges of Trade in an attempt to assist them in ascertaining such intention.
As the onus lies on the taxpayer to prove that an assessment is excessive,74
the practical eﬀect of a sole focus on intention will be that the taxpayer will
have to prove, without the aid of any framework, that he did not intend for
the assets to be acquired as trading stock. The Revenue authorities’ case is
made even easier to make out if the second limb of the speciﬁc test is
applied in isolation from the ﬁrst limb. In eﬀect, the taxpayer has the
burden of proving something which can be very diﬃcult to show indeed;
that he acquired the assets with the intention of holding them as long-term
investments.
72Teo (n 25).
73Royal Commission (n 68) [116].
74See CEC v CIT (n 64) [9] and [23]–[24].
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6.2. Other consequences: section 10(1)(a) v section 10(1)(g)
A sole focus on intention in the speciﬁc test has an additional consequence of
making it even more important that receipts are assessed under the correct
head of charge: section 10(1)(a) or section 10(1)(g). As mentioned above,
the Revenue authorities enjoy certain advantages if the assessment is made
under section 10(1)(a): the taxpayer has no framework on which to prove
intention, and the taxpayer has to show that he acquired the assets with
the intention of holding them as long-term investments.
Apart from issues of evidence and proof, it is noted that while both sections
10(1)(a) and (g) income are taxable, there is a diﬀerence in the applicable tax
restrictions. As the Singapore Court of Appeal noted in JD v CIT:
[C]ertain tax restrictions are not visited on section 10(1)(a)-sourced income.
For instance, only section 10(1)(a) assessment (see s 37(3)(a)), and unab-
sorbed section 10(1)(a) losses can be carried forward for set-oﬀ against stat-
utory income of future years of assessment upon satisfying certain criteria
in s 37(5). For non-section 10(1)(a) sources, s 14(1) requires a source-by-
source concept to be applied, whereby the expenses incurred in the pro-
duction of each source of income must be scrupulously matched against
the source.75
Further, where a taxpayer is assessed under section 10(1)(a), it may deduct
capital allowances against its assessable income, whereas it will be unable
to do so if assessed under section 10(1)(g).
It should not be possible for the Revenue authorities to choose to assess
the taxpayer under section 10(1)(a) or (g). The language of section 10(1)(g)
makes it exceedingly clear that it is mutually exclusive from the other subsec-
tions in section 10(1). In other words, it can only apply where none of the
other subsections can apply to the gain in question. Indeed, as seen above,
this was the approach of the Privy Council in M v DGIR, where their Lordships
expressly addressed the possibility that the receipts could fall under any other
head of charge before proceeding to determine whether they were section 4
(f) income.76
6.3. Knowing when to apply each sub-section
In practice, however, the line between cases where section 10(1)(a) applies
and where section 10(1)(g) applies may not be quite so easy to draw. By
way of illustration, consider the three cases of BQY v CIT,77 NP v CIT78 and
75JD v Comptroller of Income Tax [2006] 1 SLR(R) 484 [45].
76M v DGIR (n 26) 74.
77BQY v CIT was an appeal to the High Court from the ITBR, where it was initially reported as GCA & GCB v
CIT.
78NP and another v Comptroller of Income Tax [2007] 4 SLR(R) 599 (NP v CIT).
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GCH v CIT,79 which may be said to be similar in many respects. The trans-
actions entered into by the taxpayers followed a simple pattern of the pur-
chase of several properties, followed by a sale of those properties at a
proﬁt. The gains in BQY v CIT were assessed under section 10(1)(g), while
those in NP v CIT and GCH v CIT were assessed under section 10(1)(a). There
were three property transactions in the ﬁrst case, while there were seven
and ﬁve transactions respectively in the latter two cases. As the facts of the
cases are substantially similar, one might surmise that the main diﬀerence
between the cases is the number of transactions involved. However, it is by
no means clear what the ‘threshold’ is for ‘crossing over’ from section 10
(1)(g) to section 10(1)(a). Things are complicated by the fact that in none of
the section 10(1)(g) cases was it submitted that the gains should be assessed
under section 10(1)(a) instead. The applicable section not being an issue
before the courts, the classiﬁcation of cases as involving sections 10(1)(a) or
(g) based on the numbers of properties sold are the result of agreement
between the Revenue authorities and various taxpayers, and by no means
representative of any legal principle.
But the number of transactions, viewed in isolation, cannot be determina-
tive. In the case of a company, there seems to be a presumption that it is
trading once it engages in a single transaction.80 For an individual, the
general rule appears to be that one or two isolated transactions is insuﬃ-
cient,81 except in the case of one who has intended to engage in a trade.82
It would thus appear that frequency is not the sole factor which separates
section 10(1)(a) from section 10(1)(g). It is more likely that the primary deter-
minant is intention. However, at the present moment, it is diﬃcult to see any
clear principles laid down by the courts that would aid us in distinguishing
situations where section 10(1)(a) applies and those where section 10(1)(g)
applies.
Yet this is a profoundly unsatisfactory situation, given that in order to deter-
mine whether a receipt is in the nature of section 10(1)(g) income, it is necess-
ary to ﬁrst exclude the possibility of it falling under any other head of charge.
There must be at least some analysis to rule out the other heads of charge
before applying the section 10(1)(g) test. Such analysis appears to be unfortu-
nately lacking in the existing jurisprudence, where the courts appear to apply
the section 10(1)(g) test in isolation of the general concept of income, or of the
other speciﬁc tests for sections 10(1)(a)–(f) income. The current approach of
applying the section 10(1)(g) test directly risks rendering sections 10(1)(a)–(f)
otiose.
79GCH v The Comptroller of Income Tax (2018) MSTC 50–031 (GCH v CIT).
80See International Investment Ltd. v Comptroller-General of Inland Revenue [1979] 1 MLJ 4, 6 (International
Investment), SCL v CIT (n 49), and GRP v CIT (n 49).
81DEF v CIT (n 15) 59.
82ibid 61, and International Investment (n 80) 6.
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6.4. Diﬀerent mechanisms for determining intention
Under the current jurisprudence, it would be accurate to say that the ITBR has
‘divorced the analysis under section 10(1)(g) from any consideration of
whether a trade or business exists, or may be intended to exist’.83 The
ﬁndings from this analysis would only be relevant to determine whether
section 10(1)(a) applies, and thus, to the issue of whether section 10(1)(g) is
inapplicable. However, apart from this, the ﬁndings would not be relevant
to section 10(1)(g) at all.84 In all the section 10(1)(g) cases in Singapore, the
courts have not expressly applied the Badges of Trade test; instead, they
have focused on the sole factor of the intention of the taxpayer. One might
add while the ﬁndings may be relevant to whether section 10(1)(a) applies,
thus excluding section 10(1)(g), such analysis has never been expressly
done in any of the section 10(1)(g) cases to date.
It is also accurate to say that under the section 10(1)(a) and (g) tests, ‘[b]oth
approaches focus on the intention of the taxpayer at the time of acquisition of
the asset disposed of’.85 The section 10(1)(g) test provides that ‘unless the
Appellant proves that the gains were made by him on the disposal of proper-
ties that were acquired with the intention of being held by him as long-term
investments, this appeal fails’.86 For the Badges of Trade test, the applicable
principle was laid out by the House of Lords in Simmons v IRC, which held
that ‘[t]rading requires an intention to trade; normally the question to be
asked is whether this intention existed at the time of the acquisition of the
asset’.87
However, it is respectfully submitted that it may not be true to say that
there is little practical diﬀerence between the two approaches.88 While both
the section 10(1)(g) test and the Badges of Trade do focus on the intention
of the taxpayer, the means through which they determine the said intention
diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Under the section 10(1)(g) test, the intention of the tax-
payer has to be directly ascertained by the court; no framework or list of
indicia are provided to assist the court in making this judgment. However,
it is argued that it is precisely the deﬁciencies in this kind of approach that
resulted in the introduction of the Badges of Trade in the ﬁrst place.
The original report of the Royal Commission which laid out the Badges of
Trade test makes it clear that the focus of the test was the ascertainment of
the taxpayer’s motive. However, the taxpayer’s motive is by no means easily
determined. The Badges of Trade were thus preferred as they oﬀered
83Tang (n 53) 350.
84ibid.
85ibid 349 (emphasis added).
86IB v CIT (n 4) [39]. The same was held in HZ v CIT (n 5) [53].
87Simmons (as liquidator of Lionel Simmons Properties Ltd) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1980] STC 350
(HL) 352.
88See Tang (n 53) 349.
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‘objective tests of what is a trading adventure instead of concerning itself
directly with the unravelling of motive’.89 The Royal Commission further
stated that ‘if motive is to be ascertained, it is better ascertained by being
imputed as the automatic result of prescribed conditions than by an
attempt to search the mind of the taxpayer himself’.90
Thus, while both tests are objective in nature, the section 10(1)(g) test lacks
a framework on which to assess the intention of the taxpayer, a problem
which the Badges of Trade were precisely introduced to counter. Instead, in
the application of the section 10(1)(g) test, the court directly proceeds to
objectively determine the intention of the taxpayer. Indeed in the existing
case law on section 10(1)(g), we do not see the application of any clear frame-
work to assist the court in determining the taxpayer’s intention.
It would thus appear that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences for a taxpayer
depending on whether his receipts are assessed under section 10(1)(a) or
(g). Such diﬀerences become even more stark if the courts should choose
to apply an interpretation of the speciﬁc test with a sole focus on taxpayer
intention.
7. Conclusion
Since the section 10(1)(g) test was laid down in IB v CIT, the cases show a
growing gulf between the tests for section 10(1)(a) income and section 10
(1)(g) income. While the Badges of Trade test for section 10(1)(a) income
requires a holistic assessment of various indicia in order to establish whether
a gain or proﬁt is in the nature of income, the cases suggest that the section
10(1)(g) test was becoming construed as requiring the taxpayer to satisfy the
Board that he did not intend to proﬁt from the transaction at the time of acqui-
sition of the asset. There may even have been a suggestion that the taxpayer
was required to show that he intended to hold onto the asset as a long-term
investment at the time of acquisition. Phrased in such a way, the section 10
(1)(g) test put the taxpayer at a considerable disadvantage as compared to if
the assessment of the gain or proﬁt had been made under section 10(1)(a)
instead. Given the rather blurry distinction between cases which should fall
under the section 10(1)(a) situation and those which should fall under
section 10(1)(g), there is currently an incentive for the Revenue authorities to
assess the taxpayer under section 10(1)(g) wherever possible.
No good conceptual reason has been put forward as to why we should
consider a multitude of factors when testing for section 10(1)(a) income
and only one factor when testing for section 10(1)(g) income. One would
have thought that on a common-sense approach, using the same list of
89Royal Commission (n 68) [116].
90ibid [113].
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factors for section 10(1)(a) income and removing those speciﬁc to trade,
would have produced a test ﬁt for application to section 10(1)(g).
This article has sought to show that theMyer Emporium case was decided in
a very diﬀerent statutory context and that the section 10(1)(g) test should not
be based on principles drawn fromMyer Emporium. However, it has been sub-
mitted that the modiﬁed Badges of Trade approach may ﬁt in nicely with the
existing jurisprudence. In contrast, a sole focus on intention is untenable in
light of the foregoing discussion and is apt to result in injustice. The
modiﬁed Badges of Trade test should be applied instead as it provides a
much better structural framework with which to determine the question of
whether a gain or proﬁt from the disposal of an asset is in the nature of
capital gains or income.
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